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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years after the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,' Dr. Kenneth Clark's "doll study"2 remains relevant and vi-
tal for practitioners and academics alike.3 The powerful image of chil-
dren in segregated schools who preferred white dolls to black dolls
resonates as one of the lasting symbols of the Court's opinion. During
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor, Washburn University School of
Law. I thank my colleagues, Professors Ali Khan, Megan Ballard, Ellen Byers and Alex
Glashausser for helpful feedback. I am also grateful for the research assistance provided by
Nicholas Purifoy.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Dr. Clark's study was originally published in 1950 as part of a White House confer-
ence on the welfare of children. See Kenneth B. Clark, The Effect of Prejudice and Dis-
crimination on Personality Development, White House Midcentury Conference on
Children and Youth (1950). Clark's findings were later published in 1955. KENNETH B.
CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter CLARK, PREJUDICE].
3 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, If at First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time?
Group Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENJTARV
215, 217 n.9 (1998) (suggesting that the Clark doll study was the most relevant social sci-
ence citation in the Brown decision, in spite of the study's methodological flaws). Over the
years, however, the Clark study has been questioned precisely for its methodological accu-
racy and inferential assumptions. See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote
11, and the Multidisciplinarity of Law, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 279, 293-95 (2004) (discussing the
study's problems with causation, methodology, and psychological characterization); Allan
Ides, Tangled Up in Brown, 47 How. L.J. 3, 12 (2003) (citing criticism of the Clark study for
a "lack of scientific rigor and for [the] failure to support the specific thesis that segregation
causes feelings of infericsity").
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oral argument in one of Brown's consolidated companion cases,4
Thurgood Marshall referred to Clark's doll study as evidence that "ap-
pellants in this very case . . .were injured as a result of this segrega-
tion."5 In response, John W. Davis, the attorney representing South
Carolina, belittled the significance of the study,6 citing evidence that
African American children in northern states chose white dolls-and
labeled black dolls as "bad"-at even greater rates than children from
the segregated south. 7
Davis's challenge to the reliability of the doll study, however,
failed to diminish its powerful imagery. The study not only provided a
vehicle for introducing social science evidence, but also reminded the
Supreme Court of the victims' unique perspective." In the study,
child participants selected white or black dolls in response to a series
of questions meant to reveal their racial preferences. 9 At various ages,
a majority of the black children expressed a preference for the white
dolls.' 0 Rejection of the black dolls underscored the children's aware-
ness of racial differences and highlighted the belief that with white
dolls they could imagine a better life for themselves.
Robert Carter, who represented the Brown plaintiffs at oral argu-
ment, recognized the study's potential, calling it "an Aladdin's lamp."
Carter, Marshall, and their NAACP colleagues used this study as a ve-
hicle for explaining "white privilege"'" to the Supreme Court.
4 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 1 (1952) (consolidating Brown from four concur-
rent appeals in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia federal
courts).
5 ARGUMEN-T: THE OPAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 1952-55, at 38 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) [hereinafter ARGUMENT].
6 Clark's study has been criticized a great deal over the last fifty years. See generally A.
James Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. Ras. L.
REV. 621, 623 (1963) (claiming that social science tends "to support racial separation in the
schools" (emphasis removed)); Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegrega-
tion Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REV. 69, 69 (1960) (accusing Clark of
engaging in "pseudo-scientific 'proof").
7 ARGUMENT, supra note 5, at 59. According to Clark's study, 52% of the black chil-
dren in the South thought the white doll was "nice," while 68% of the northern black
children thought the white doll was "nice." Forty-nine percent of the black children in the
South thought the black doll was "bad," while 71% of the children in the North thought
the black doll was "bad." Id. at 58-59.
8 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWvN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALItY 408 (1976).
9 See CLARK, PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 22-23. In order to determine racial prefer-
ences, the interviewers asked the children the following four questions: (1) give me the
doll that you like to play with or the doll you like best; (2) give me the doll that is the nice
doll; (3) give me the doll that looks bad; (4) give me the doll that is a nice color. Id. at 23.
10 See CLARK, PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 23 n.3.
11 See generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 86-87 (1996) ("To people of color, who are Victims of
racism/white supremacy, race is a filter through which they see he world. Whites do not
look at the world through this filter of racial awareness, even though they always constitute
a race."); Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604
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The Brown decision brought to the forefront many of the unful-
filled constitutional vows made to prior generations. At the time of
the nation's independence, the Founders extended declarations of
equality to only a select few.1 2 Nearly a century later, following the
Civil War, a new constitutional promise ensured that victims of slavery
would share full rights of citizenship and that racial subordination
would become a thing of the past.a3 In Brown, the Court acknowl-
edged the failure of prior generations to fulfill this promise.
1 4
Half a century later, this Symposium invites us to assess Brown's
aftermath and provides an opportunity to ask whether, on this third
time around, our generation has kept the promise. Answers to this
question should again be assessed from the same perspective as that
which resonated with the Justices in Brown: the image of children
choosing dolls. Claims of formal equality should be challenged if they
conflict with the experiences of girls and boys on the playground, in
their homes, and in their communities. In other words, Brown's leg-
acy should be judged by asking whether victims of race discrimination
now receive genuinely equal treatment.
I
THE ORIGINAL PROMISE
The promise of equality to all citizens of the United States
originated with the nation's independence, when Thomas Jefferson
declared that "all men are created equal."' 5 Subsequent constitu-
tional text, however, diluted Jefferson's words. Still, the Articles of
Confederation managed to avoid explicit divisions based upon race
while lacking Jefferson's egalitarian vision. 16 The Constitution, how-
ever, conspicuously failed to deliver a commitment to equality compa-
rable to the promises of the Declaration of Independence.' 7 By
(1999) ("White privilege is the pervasive, structural, and generally invisible assumption that
white people define a norm and Black people are 'others,' dangerous, and inferior.").
12 See infra text accompanying notes 15-20.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 27-33.
14 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954); see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination
AboveAlk Sex, Race, and EqualProtection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1022 (1986) (noting "closer
examination shows that the anti-subordination principle dominated the Court's analysis
[in Brown]").
15 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
16 'While drafting the Articles of Confederation, delegates overwhelmingly rejected a
motion to amend the text to insert the word "white" so that the citizenship clause of those
Articles would have read: "All white freemen of every State, excluding paupers, vagabonds,
and so forth, shall be citizens of the United States." See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION 9 (1992). o
17 See Paul Finkleman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 413, 416-17 (2001) (suggesting that the Framers insulated slavery and by-
passed many opportunities to constrict it).
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counting slaves as three-fifths of a person,' 8 southern states secured
more representative power in the new government than they would
have if slaves, who had no right to vote, had not been counted at all.1 9
As predicted by Gouverneur Morris during the Constitutional Con-
vention, slavery became the "curse of heaven." 20
Decades later, when Chief Justice Taney assessed the congres-
sional authority to prohibit slavery in United States territories in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,21 he concluded that the founding generation only
promised equality to those with European ancestry. 22 For guidance,
Chief Justice Taney looked to the culture and values of the white ma-
jority.23  The Framers "considered [African Americans] as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by
the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority."2 4 Chief Justice Taney, therefore, con-
cluded that the Constitution embodied the racism of the founding
generation.25 Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scott substituted
his views of racial superiority for the congressional decision to end
slavery in territories of the United States. 26
After the Civil War, members of the Reconstruction Congress
amended the Constitution-not only to abolish slavery, but also to
eradicate the racist ideology that ChiefJustice Taney relied upon and
to offer the victims of past discrimination new constitutional protec-
tion.2 7 Framers of the Civil War Amendments predicted the threat
posed by the dominant class of European Americans towards those of
African ancestry.2 8 In an 1866 debate, Oregon Senator George Wil-
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
19 See Finkleman, supra note 17, at 441-42 (explaining the impact of the Three-Fifths
Clause on the electoral college).
20 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 411
(1966).
21 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
22 Id. at 406.
23 Id. at 404-05.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 409 ("We refer to these historical facts [of subjugation] for the purpose of
showing the fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that day
spoke and acted.").
26 In fact, throughout the opinion, ChiefJustice Taney labeled African Americans as
an inferior class or whites as a dominant race twenty-one times. SeeA. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence: Chief Justice Roger Taney 's Defense and
Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDozo L. REV.
1695, 1703 (1996).
27 See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 45 B.C. L. REv. 307, 309 (2004) (discussing the racist past leading to the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments and slow ideological reform that followed).
28 See generally Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 306 (1879)
At the time when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it required
little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long
been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised
[Vol. 90:419
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liams explained that "there is a bitter and cruel prejudice against
[those of African descent] everywhere, and a large minority of the
people of this country to-day, if they had the power, would deprive
them of all political and civil rights and reduce them to a state of
abject servitude."29 Ohio Senator Benjamin Wade added that blacks
suffer "under the ban of a hostile race grinding them to powder. ' °
In order to transform such a society, Congress sought the consti-
tutional authority to protect the civil rights of all U.S. citizens. Con-
gressman John Bingham, primary author of the Fourteenth
Amendment,,' focused on the issue of race before declaring: "The
spirit, the intent, the purpose of our Constitution is to secure equal
and exact justice to all men. That has not been done."32 Regardless
of whether the original Framers promised racial equality in the past,
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution made that promise explicit to future generations.
33
Indeed, when the Supreme Court first considered the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a majority of the Justices emphasized the
central importance of ending racial discrimination against those who
had been enslaved. In the Slaughter-House Cases,34 Justice Miller's ma-
jority opinion noted the historical background of the Amendment,
explaining that "notwithstanding the formal recognition by those
[Confederate] States of the abolition of slavery, the condition of the
slave race would, without further protection of the Federal govern-
ment, be almost as bad as it was before." 35 This assessment led the
Court to conclude that:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in [the Civil War Amendments], lying at the foundation of
each, and without which none of them would have been even sug-
gested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.36
to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike,
and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinc-
tions that had before existed.
29 Cot;.. GcOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1866) (debating questions regarding voting
rights in Washington, DC.).
30 Id. at 63 (distinguishing the plight of African Atmericans from that of "ladies of the
land" to whom the Senator would not extend voting rights).
.41 See Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE LJ. 57, 58 (1993).
'2 CONG. GtnOms, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1866).
S3 U.S. CoNST. amends. Xl1, XIV, XV.
34 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
35 Id., at 70.
36 Id. at 71.
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In mockingJustice Miller's limited vision of federal power to pro-
tect individual rights, critics often denigrate, rather than applaud,
Miller's focus on ending racial subordination.3 7 Such criticism fails to
give credit to Miller's insight that the nation could not simply turn
over authority to a dominant group dedicated to racial superiority if it
was effectively to reverse Dred Scott and all it represented.3 8 Further-
more, eradication of racist behavior required an active agenda of pro-
tective legislation and federal enforcement.
3 9
In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court again emphasized
this understanding.40 Invalidating a state law that limited jury service
to white men, the Court explained the "true spirit and meaning"
41 of
the Civil War Amendments:
At the time when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it
required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those
who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would,
when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon
with jealousy and positive dislike .... It was in view of these consid-
erations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted.
42
37 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 76 (1997) ("[T]he Slaughterhouse case, in its central focus, had nothing to do
with race, and the decision could therefore in no way be beneficial to black people."); 2
WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1119 (1953) (noting that "[t]he first of the things the Supreme Court has
done to the initial section of the Fourteenth Amendment is to make its Privileges and
Immunities Clause completely nugatory and useless"); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the
Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 (1994) (commenting on Slaughter-House's flawed legal conclu-
sions and incorrect judicial interpretations). Critics routinely target the Slaughter-House
decision for articulating a narrow conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges
and Immunities Clause and blame Justice Miller for the failure to incorporate the Bill of
Rights. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court
initially recognized the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source for incorporating the
Bill of Rights); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding
in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1051, 1111-15 (2000) (discussing the role of Slaughter-House in textual incorpora-
tion). But see William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REv. 153, 184 (2002) (challenging these critics for their
failure to recognize Justice Miller's coherent framework for Federalism).
38 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70 (noting that the States began to
impose significant burdens on black Americans, such that their "freedom was of little
value," highlighting the need for constitutional protection for "the unfortunate race who
had suffered so much").
39 See Rich, supra note 37, at 209 (citing Justice Miller's insight that a strong federal
government is necessary to curtail threats from powerful state governments).
40 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303 (1879) (holding unconstitutional a West Virginia statute
that effectively denied blacks the right to serve as jurors).
41 Id. at 306.
42 Id.
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The authors of the Fourteenth Amendment attempted to craft consti-
tutional protection against such hostility through the Amendment,
and the Supreme Court stated in Strauder that "[i]f this is the spirit
and meaning of the [Fourteenth A]mendment, whether it means
more or not, it is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of
its framers.
'4 3
In both the Slaughter-House Cases and Strauder, the Supreme Court
promised the victims of slavery equality-not as viewed from the per-
spective of a jealous or vindictive majority, but rather as liberally con-
strued by leaders attuned to the spirit of equality.44 Critics of those
opinions may challenge what appears to be the Court's limited scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 In making that challenge, however,
critics should not discount the constitutional promises contemporane-
ously construed by the Supreme Court. In terms consistent with the
theme of this Article, the Court's initial interpretations confirmed
that equality should be measured based upon the experiences of
those who have suffered from past discrimination rather than being
dictated by the views of an oppressive majority.
II
BREAKING THE PROMISE
Less than a decade after promulgating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the federal government broke its commitment to former slaves
and their progeny.4 6 Through the Compromise of 1877, Republicans
gained the presidency by promising to end Reconstruction. As a re-
sult, they traded away ongoing supervision of race relations in the
southern states. 47 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley cast the de-
43 Id. at 307.
44 Id. at 306 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to assure to the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white
persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoy-
ment, whenever it should be denied by the States").
45 In Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court expressed doubt that "any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of [section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment]." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873); see BLACK, supra
note 37, at 6 (claiming that the Supreme Court "clobbered" the Fourteenth Amendment
Privileges and Immunities Clause); Aynes, supra note 37, at 686 (arguing thatJustice Miller
was "hostile" toward the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also David
S. Bogen, The Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333 (2003) (summariz-
ing and rejecting alternative critiques of the Supreme Court opinion in Slaughter-House and
defending a narrower interpretation). Strauderrepeatcd that assertion. 100 U.S. (10 Otto)
at 307.
46 See RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CRow 32-33 (2003).
47 See id. at 32; see also BERNARD GROFMAN El1 AL., MiNORIY REPRESENTATION AND THE
QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 7 (1992) (indicating that the Compromise of 1877 also
marked the beginning of the systematic exclusion of black voters from the southern
electorate).
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ciding vote to sanctify the agreement. 48 In addition, Justice Bradley
wrote the 1883 opinion that limited congressional authority to address
private acts of race discrimination. 49 That same year, in Pace v. Ala-
bama,50 the Court unanimously upheld laws imposing criminal punish-
ment on interracial marriage, explaining that "punishment of each
offending person, whether white or black, is the same" and therefore
valid under the Equal Protection Clause.51 With these opinions, the
Court abandoned its resolve to protect former slaves from a domi-
neering majority. Assessing these decisions, even children would have
perceived the gap between the formal equality of the law and their
experiences of inequality.
In Plessy v. Ferguson,52 the Supreme Court broadened the premise
accepted in Pace, upholding racial segregation and embedding the
doctrine of "equal but separate" into constitutional jurisprudence. 53
According to the Court's opinion, authored by Justice Brown, Homer
Plessy possessed an indiscernible "mixture of colored blood"5 4 and
under Louisiana law he could only ride in railway passenger cars to
which, by race, he "belonged."55 Upholding that law, the Court re-
jected the argument that "social prejudices may be overcome by legis-
lation,' 56 and deferred "to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order."
57
The Court acknowledged the issues of racial dominance and inferi-
ority,5 18 concluding that "iff the civil and political rights of both races
be equal[,] one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If
one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane."59
48 Justice Bradley cast the deciding vote as part of the commission certifying the 1876
presidential election of Rutherford B. Hayes. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A Bio-
GRAPHiCAL DICTIONARY 33 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994).
49 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
50 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
I ld. at 585.
52 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53 Id. at 540. Six years earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a Mississippi statute requir-
ing "equal, but separate, accommodations for the white and colored races" as applied
solely to intrastate railroad transportation. Louisville, N.O. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi,
133 U.S. 587, 588 (1890). Justices Harlan and Bradley dissented on grounds that the stat-
ute regulated commerce among the states. Id. at 595 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 551.
57 Id. at 550.
58 Id. at 551.
59 Id. at 551-52.
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In dissent, Justice Harlan accepted the racist assumptions of the
Court, 60 but also wrote with candor about the real purpose of the Lou-
isiana law: acting "under the guise of giving equal accommodation for
whites and blacks,"6 1 the state placed "the brand of servitude and deg-
radation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before
the law." 62 Justice Harlan thus exposed the reality underlying the ma-
jority's myth of equal treatment.
Justice Harlan also recognized the echoes of Dred Scott in the ma-
jority's treatment of Homer Plessy.6 3 The Supreme Court opinions of
Plessy and Dred Scott share the assumption that courts must reify the
views of racial superiority held by the dominant majority.64 According
to those views, the Constitution embodies the Framers' racist assump-
tions, embracing slavery in 1787 and segregated schools and facilities
in 1868.65
The Plessy decision represents a broad pattern of collective racial
subordination. 66 Additional illustrations exist in the context of public
schools, voting booths, and courtrooms. In all three, the government
has primary responsibility for protecting and promoting rights of citi-
zenship; yet, in all three, Supreme Court decisions helped cement a
structure of white dominance. 67
In the field of education, segregation also meant inferior treat-
ment. Just three years after Plessy, the Supreme Court indicated that
equal did not really mean "equal;" Justice Harlan's opinion for a
unanimous Court held that "education of people in schools main-
tained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective
states."'68 Based on its concern with federal "interference," the Court
denied injunctive relief when the county "temporarily and for eco-
nomic reasons" suspended the only available high school for African-
60 See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The white race deems itself to be the domi-
nant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth
and in power.").
61 Id. at 557.
62 Id. at 562.
63 Id. at 559 (noting that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case").
64 See, e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 803, 864-78 (2004) (analyzing the role of racial stigma in Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
'-' See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
66 See, e.g., Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Reading Dred Scott, Plessy, and Brown: Toward a
Constitutional Hermeneutics, 38 How. L.J. 53, 70 (1994) ("Plessy, like Dred Scott, was a case
about defining the political community, [the black] collective identity, and the role of the
Court in that process.").
67 See infra Part IV.
68 Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
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American children. 69 In the subsequent Berea College case, 70 ostensibly
deferring only to the state authority to regulate corporations, the
Court effectively closed the door to private higher education for racial
minorities by allowing states to prohibit colleges from simultaneously
teaching persons of different races. 7 1 The Supreme Court became
even more explicit in Gong Lum v. Rice,7 2 upholding the right of states
to bar "pure whites" from attending school with "the brown, yellow
and black races." 73
Congress explicitly protected voting rights with the enactment of
the Fifteenth Amendment,7 4 and African Americans voted in large
numbers in the years immediately following the Civil War.75 After a
brief period of significant participation, however, whites engaged in a
concerted campaign of violence, fraud, and alternative disen-
franchisement schemes that systematically excluded blacks from the
southern electorate. 76 In the fifteen years following the Compromise
of 1877, the number of southern black voters dwindled by a half.
77
In Williams v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court officially endorsed
various devices used to block black voters.78 At that time, the Missis-
sippi constitution limited voters based upon payment of taxes, crimi-
nal history, and a discretionary test of literacy, which required voters
to be able to understand or interpret a designated section of the state
constitution. 79 An administrative officer had final authority to reject
or register "whomsoever he [chose]."80 Williams's attorney described
these provisions as a "scheme . . . to abridge the suffrage of the
colored electors in the State of Mississippi,"8' but the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the law, noting that its reach included "weak and
vicious white men as well as weak and vicious black men. 8 2
Finally, even in the courtroom, the Supreme Court's initial pro-
tective stance in Strauder gave way to barriers, assuring that few, if any,
minorities would serve on juries. In Williams, described above, Missis-
sippi's statutory scheme permittedjury selection from a pool of "quali-
69 Id.
70 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
71 Id. at 58.
72 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
73 Id. at 82.
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
75 See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 5 (noting that in 1868, more than 700,000
blacks were registered to vote and a number held public offices).
76 See id. at 6-10.
77 Id. at 7.
78 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
79 Id. at 220-21.
80 Id. at 221.
81 Id. at 214.
82 Id. at 222.
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fled" electors, which essentially prohibited African Americans from
serving.""
Supreme Court decisions of the era that resulted in white domi-
nation of education,8 4 voting,8 5 and the criminal justice system8 6 can
be explained in terms of a prejudiced conception of "equality." In
these cases, the Court justified its decision by reasoning that the laws
at issue applied equally to each race. Whites could not attend school
(or, for that matter, eat, sleep, or drink from a fountain) with blacks
any more than blacks could attend white schools. 87 Literacy tests and
morality qualifications for voters ostensibly applied with the same
force to every race, just as both prosecutors and defense counsel were
free to use peremptory challenges in any manner they chose. 88
Even the children in segregated areas recognized that these prac-
tices conflicted with a sense of fairness and equality. Children living
in communities with segregated school systems knew the difference
between the "good" schools and "bad" schools, as much as they knew
how to distinguish "nice" and "bad" dolls. 89 For instance, in Topeka,
Linda Brown had to walk a mile in order to attend the Monroe School
when she lived just three and a half blocks from the Sumner School, a
school for white children; 90 in a Kansas winter those extra blocks must
have seemed long and cold. Children in Mississippi knew that no Afri-
can American would be elected to public office even where blacks
made up a majority of the potential electorate.9 1 They would also re-
alize that only whites would be selected to serve on a jury. The Su-
preme Court's judicial rationalizations and disingenuous arguments
that the laws applied equally bore no relationship to the reality exper-
ienced by black children at the time.
III
RESTORING THE PROMISE
The separate but equal doctrine embodied many myths of racial
equality. Indeed, in order to fully comprehend the fundamental flaws
in the doctrine, consider the image of children playing with dolls, for
83 Id. at 214.
84 See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S.
45 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
85 See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
86 See, e.g., id.
87 See KLuGER, supra note 8, at 88.
88 See, e.g., Williams, 170 U.S. at 223.
89 See supra text accompanying note 9-10.
90 See KLUGER, supra note 8, at 408.
91 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1965) (noting that, although
in 1890 blacks made up a majority of qualified voters in Mississippi, various barriers de-
signed to keep blacks from voting "worked so well" that by 1954 "only about 5% of the
Negroes of voting age in Mississippi were registered").
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whom the damaging effects were painfully clear. The Brown Court
attempted to restore the promise made to these children decades ear-
lier; instead of looking at the case as a test of the Framers' original
intent,92 the majority relied upon the reality of the racial dominance
reflected in the choices made by those little boys and girls.93
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court took an "activist"
role, 94 deviating from precedent and rejecting the equality myths.95
The Court recognized that generations of enforced school segrega-
tion could not be corrected through passive reliance on "neighbor-
hood schools" or alternative schemes designed to perpetuate racial
identification.9 6 Instead, the Court called for desegregation "root and
branch,''9 7 and authorized broad remedial authority to carry out that
pledge. 98
The new commitment recognized in Brown also found its way into
the voting booth and the courtroom. Through a combination of con-
stitutional amendment9 9 and judicial decree, 10 0 poll taxes became a
thing of the past. Likewise, "interpretation tests" were seen for their
true purpose: "not [as] a test but a trap." 0 1 Eventually, the Court also
upheld the congressional authority to end the use of literacy tests.
1 0 2
92 Spe Brown v. Bd, of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (concluding that arguments about the
Framers' original intent behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment were
"inconclusive").
93 Id. at 494 n.l1 (citing sociological and psychological evidence introduced by the
petitioners displaying the detrimental effects of racial segregation).
94 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (discussing
the need for equitable remedies for state-imposed segregation); Green v. County Sch. Bd.,
391 U.S. 430, 438-42 (1968) (stating that the county "freedom of choice" plan did not
adequately desegregate and failed to create educational equality),
95 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 (noting that the Court must consider the effect of segre-
gation on public education itself, not just the "tangible factors" like "buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers").
96 See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 441 (explaining that the county's "freedom of choice"
plan was insufficient to dismantle a segregated school system because no white child had
ever enrolled in the predominantly black schools).
97 See id. at 438.
98 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (barring "any poll tax or other tax" as a prerequisite to
voting in federal elections).
100 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating state poll
tax).
101 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965); see also id. at 148 (noting that
from 1921 until 1944, the percentage of registered black voters never exceeded one per-
cent); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 132-33, 137-38 (1965) (striking Missis-
sippi tests for "understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship" and
demonstrating "good moral character").
102 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding congressional pro-
hibition of literacy tests as applied to New York City residents from Puerto Rico); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which suspended state literacy and other voting tests); see also Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285, 293 (1969) (striking literacy tests that had "the effect of deny-
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As the breadth of topics in this Symposium clearly indicates, the
precedential value of Brown extended far beyond the classroom. The
Warren Court recognized the need for substantive support to effectu-
ate otherwise dormant legal abstractions.' 0  Prior to Brown, criminal
defendants were ostensibly guaranteed the "right to counsel" and the
"privilege against self-incrimination," yet these guarantees were mean-
ingless in light of the systemic reality. The Supreme Court finally in-
fused these abstractions with substance when it ordered states to
provide counsel' 0 4 and to inform defendants of their rights.
10 5 Simi-
larly, a broader perspective of Brown recognizes the importance of
"fundamental fairness" for those who live with the consequences of
unjust government action. Brown represented a new promise and a
broad commitment to tear down the facade and to produce genuine
equality for all persons living in the United States.
IV
RESURRECTING PLESSY AND DRED SCOTT
Fifty years after the Brown decision, it is time to assess whether we
have been faithful to that promise. The long tenure of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist represents a jurisprudential era of colorblind
equality. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, judicial intervention
should be sharply limited to those cases in which specific and inten-
tional racial discrimination by government officials can be tied to at-
tendance at a particular school. 10 6 He dissented when other Justices
ruled that intentional segregation in a significant portion of a school
system gave rise to a presumption that a district should be subject to
system-wide remedies.1 0 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to narrow
the scope of judicial intervention and to emphasize colorblind deci-
sionmaking eventually led to the withdrawal of judicial support for
eliminating the effects of segregation. 10 8
ing the right to vote on account of race or color because the State ...has maintained
separate and inferior schools" (internal quotation omitted)).
103 GERALD KURLAND, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER WARREN 3 (D. Steve Rahmas ed.,
1973) ("Under Warren, the Supreme Court adopted a policy of judicial activism which
stressed the responsibility of the Court to see that the Constitutional guarantees of the Bill
of Rights were made binding upon both state and federal governments.").
104 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (recognizing the right to
counsel for criminal defendants).
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (ruling that the police must
inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel).
106 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 254-55 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
107 See id. at 257-58.
108 See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (holding that courts should
eliminate "vestiges of past discrimination ... to the extent practicable"). The Chief Justice
also noted that residential segregation resulted from private decisionmaking and econom-
20051
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Kansas City, Missouri school district provides a vivid example
of the growing antagonism towards the goal of achieving racial inte-
gration. The inner city schools in Kansas City suffered years of neglect
as whites fled to the suburbs and funds for education within the city
steadily declined. 10 9 Drawing upon the principles expressed in Brown
H that "the vitality of... constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them," 110 the district court
ruled that fears of white flight cannot be used as a factor to justify the
refusal to integrate."1 ' Indeed, the district court emphasized that
white flight "cannot be accepted [as a reason] for achieving anything
less than the 'complete uprooting of the dual public school sys-
tem.' 11 1  The Supreme Court, however, rejected that analysis."13
Demonstrating remarkable antipathy towards Brown and its progeny,
the majority's decision, written by the ChiefJustice, blamed the "white
flight" on court-ordered desegregation and barred the district court
from taking affirmative steps to reverse the outward flow of stu-
dents." 4 The five Justices in the majority thus gave their stamp of
approval to the convoluted logic that, although intentional segrega-
tion necessitated judicial intervention, states engaging in that segrega-
tion could not be held accountable for the repercussions of that
action.
Assertions of colorblindness by the current Supreme Court suffer
from the same basic flaws that characterized the majority opinion in
Plessy.1 1 5 Examples drawn again from the contexts of schools, voting
booths, and courtrooms reveal that courts will no longer scrutinize
government action that reinforces private prejudice. In each context,
constitutional rulings, initially designed to protect minority rights, en-
ded up being construed in a manner that disadvantaged the victims of
past discrimination, thereby violating the spirit of the Equal Protec-
ics and was therefore "too attenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation." Id. at
n.2.
109 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (noting that
"[s]egregation has caused a system wide reduction in student achievement"), affd as modi-
fied, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
110 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
1 1 Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 37. A similar approach had been applied by the Supreme
Court to fears that "white students will flee the school system." Monroe v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
112 Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 37 (quoting United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972)).
113 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
114 Id. at 99-100. The Court accepted the "typical supposition" that "'white flight' may
result from desegregation, not de jure segregation." Id. at 95.
115 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1896) (holding that federal law permits
distinctions to be drawn along racial lines because such distinctions do not create a state of
"involuntary servitude").
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tion Clause and failing the most basic yardstick of fairness and equal-
ity-that of a child.
A. Public Education
Twenty-five years ago, groups gathered around the nation to
mark the passage of a quarter century since the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Brown v. Board of Education.1 16 In Topeka, a small group of law-
yers attended the ceremonies and afterwards met to discuss the plight
of education in the school system where Brown originated. 117 In pre-
ceding years, the local school board had thwarted federal attempts to
challenge the remaining segregation in Topeka schools. 1 8 Many
seemed to have forgotten the promise of Brown.
When the Supreme Court originally agreed to hear arguments in
Brown, Topeka school officials had abandoned their defense of segre-
gation' 19 and took immediate steps toward dismantling their dual
school system. 120 Paul Wilson, an attorney with the Kansas Attorney
General's office, appeared for the defense only at the request of the
Supreme Court;1 2 1 even then, much of his time at oral argument was
focused on questions about whether the case had become moot.'
22
Affirmative steps to dismantle segregation in Topeka, however, con-
sisted of little more than a phased closure of black schools 23 and as-
surances of optional attendance zones to white parents. 24
116 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117 Meeting with WilliamJ. Rich, Richard Jones, Charles Scott, Jr., and Joseph Johnson
in Topeka, Kansas (May 17, 1979).
118 See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501 v. Weinberger, No. 74-160-C5 (D. Kan. 1974) (unpub-
lished decision) (involving an action by successor to the Topeka School Board to enjoin
investigation by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare into ongoing allega-
tions of race discrimination).
119 See ARGUMENT, supra note 5, at 259-60 (noting the Topeka School Board's decision
against sending a lawyer to defend its segregated schools and describing the Board's deseg-
regation attempts prior to the Brown oral arguments).
120 When the Supreme Court ruled on remedial issues, it noted that Topeka schools
had already made "substantial progress" towards desegregation. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
121 See KI.UGER, supra note 8, at 548 (noting that the Supreme Court "virtually ordered
the attorney general to participate").
122 ARGUMENT, supra note 5, at 259-72.
123 See id. at 339-43 (providing the Kansas Attorney General's review of actions taken
to comply with the Supreme Court's order in Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851,
855-57 (10th Cir. 1989) (providing a brief factual history of elementary school enroll-
ment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D. Kan. 1987) (describing phased
closure of black elementary schools and adoption of neighborhood school plan); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Kan. 1955) (describing the initial plans for desegre-
gation as a "good faith effort").
124 These optional attendance zones assured parents that they would have time to
move rather than be forced to send their children to an integrated school. See Brown, 892
F.2d at 875 (stating that "the school district's use of portable classrooms and optional at-
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Experiences in Topeka, though, eventually led to what some
could describe as a happy ending. The lawyers gathering in 1979 to
commemorate Brown decided to take action. With their support, a
new group of plaintiffs, whose children attended racially identifiable
Topeka schools, successfully intervened in the case of Brown v. Board of
Education.125 Intervention led to discovery, trial, an initial ruling in
favor of the school district, 126 reversal by the Tenth Circuit,12 7 and
eventual denial of review by the Supreme Court. 12 8 After more than
forty years of litigation, the courts determined that the Topeka School
Board still had not discharged its affirmative duty to desegregate. l2 9
The district court ordered implementation of a plan that would in-
clude the building of three new schools, including two high-tech
"magnet" schools designed to attract a diverse student body.t 3° One
of the schools was even named after the family of Elijah Scott, the
lawyer who filed the original complaints in Brown. '3 1 The new schools
made a significant contribution to the Topeka community and, at
least initially, lived up to the promise of diversity. 13 2
After several years of operation, the Topeka School Board went
back to court seeking a determination that remnants of the dual
school system had been eliminated and that a unitary school system
was established in its place. 3 ' The district court agreed, finally put-
tendance zones served to maintain segregation by concentrating students of one race at
certain schools").
125 Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979). The Brown case remained
open on the District Court docket in large part because of the school board's attempts to
avoid administrative intervention. See Richard E. Jones, Brown v. Board of Education: Con-
eluding Unfinished Business, 39 WAIASHBUR, L.J. 184, 188 (2000) (discussing the district's at-
tempt to keep Brown open on the docket to "use this fact as a defensive shield to the
federal government's threat to withhold funds"). In 1974, the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) initiated administrative proceedings and
threatened to cut off federal funds for Topeka's failure to desegregate. Brown, 84 F.R.D. at
390 (citing Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501 v. Weinberger, No. 74-160-C5, (D. Kan. 1974)). The
school board successfully blocked the administrative proceedings and HEW intervention
by arguing that the district court, rather than HEW, retained jurisdiction over the Brown
case Id. at 391.
126 Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1311.
127 Brown, 892 F.2d at 889.
128 Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501 v. Smith, 509 U.S. 903 (1993).
129 See Brown, 892 F.2d at 889.
130 SeeJones, supra note 125, at 195.
131 See Michael Dobbs, Topeka's Next Challenge, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., May
17-23, 2004, at 31.
132 See GARY ORIEKLD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING's DREAM4 OR PLESSYS
NIGH IMARE? 12 (2004) (noting that a "high level of integration existed during the decade
under study (1991-2001)"), at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
reseg04/brown50.pdf. But see Dobbs, supra note 131, at 31 (noting that "Topeka schools
are among the most racially diverse in the country," but also noting a correlation between
race and "very different levels of academic success").
133 Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp. 1212, 1213-14 (D. Kan. 1999).
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ting to rest the case of Brown v. Board of Education,'34 although not
without significant costs. Because the school system was now "uni-
tary," race could no longer be considered as a factor in the placement
of students in the new magnet schools.1 35 Even if the school board
believed that racial diversity added to the quality of education, such
considerations were suspect-if not wholly condemned-by the very
constitutional provisions that previously obligated the school district
to take race into account.136 Of course, the inhabitants had not
moved and their neighborhoods had not suddenly become integrated
in the time during which the schools operated under court order.
The colorblind principle now threatens the actions that had once
been deemed an affirmative constitutional duty.
The Court's notion of colorblindness impairs government au-
thority to deal with problems of entrenched discrimination. For ex-
ample, when patterns of de facto segregation in housing affect the
racial composition of public schools, some court rulings have halted
efforts to remedy the resulting segregation.13 7 Furthermore, many de-
cisions that appear facially neutral may, in fact, perpetuate educa-
tional inequality. In the first three decades following the Brown I
decision, the district's plans to provide access to schools in certain
Topeka "neighborhoods" actually perpetuated racial identification of
those schools. 138 In Texas, reliance upon local property taxes for
funding ensured that wealthy school districts would be able to provide
more resources to their students with lower proportional tax burdens
in comparison to poor school districts. 139 Funding formulas that favor
teacher longevity and advanced degrees systematically benefit schools
with the best resources and most educated faculty. 140 To add insult to
injury, the Supreme Court bars explicit efforts to consider such factors
when fashioning effective remedies for past intentional
discrimination. 141
134 Id. at 1214.
135 Heather Hollingsworth, USD 501 Faces a New Balancing Act, ToPec.A CAP.-J., Oct. 18,
1999, at Al.
136 See generally Paul Diller, Note, Integration Without Classification: Moving Toward Race-
Neutrality in the Pursuit of Public Elementary and Secondary School Diversity, 99 MicH. L. REv.
1999 (2001) (assessing the constitutionality of various public school diversity efforts).
137 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 754 (1974) (barring cross-district reme-
dies in response to "white flight" if plaintiffs failed to prove that suburban school districts
had engaged in intentional discrimination).
1-38 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1989).
139 SeeSan Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 73-76 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
140 See id. at 79-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that "equalization" formulas
often resulted in distribution of more state aid to wealthy school districts than to their poor
counterparts).
141 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98 (1995) (barring pursuit of "desegregative
attractiveness").
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B. Reapportionment
The Supreme Court has also identified and enforced rules bar-
ring racial discrimination in apportionment of legislative districts.
District boundaries that do not follow straight lines or traditional po-
litical boundaries are suspect and trigger the search for an unlawful
racial motive.' 42 In practice, this bar almost exclusively affects redis-
tricting efforts favoring racial minorities, because a legislature seeking
to preserve the majority's electoral domination can do so without devi-
ating from traditional boundaries. That is, when whites make up a
substantial majority of a state population, it becomes relatively simple
to draw district boundaries so that whites have a majority in each con-
gressional district. Such boundaries appear "normal." Typically,
"strange" boundaries emerge only when an effort is made to give the
minority group an electoral majority within that district. 143 If this pro-
position is correct, the only litigants who can effectively challenge re-
districting attempts are those in the racial majority who question an
oddly drawn district that benefits minorities.
The Supreme Court rationalizes this decision in "colorblind"
terms by explaining that all race discrimination must be monitored by
the same stringent standards regardless of whether the minority or
majority race benefits.144 History and experience, however, have a
way of intruding upon this pretense of equal treatment. For more
than a century, judges permitted legislators to engage in grotesque
gerrymandering schemes for political reasons without significant
court intervention"t 45 and in North Carolina the legislature managed
to prevent even a single African American from winning a seat in Con-
gress from the end of Reconstruction until Congress demanded cor-
rective action in the early 1990s. 1 46 The Supreme Court did not
intervene until the state began to facilitate black representation (in a
congressional delegation that remained disproportionately white) .47
In such cases, the majority's view of racial block voting collided with
142 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding that plaintiffs stated a claim by
targeting "a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood
only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race").
143 Reapportionment in North Carolina, which is marked by frequent trips to the Su-
preme Court, provides an example of this phenomenon. The only strangely shaped dis-
tricts to attract judicial attention in that state were those in which blacks were in the
majority. See id. at 635-36.
144 See id. at 658 (requiring a "racial gerrymandering" plan to be "narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest").
145 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 180-81 & n.21 (1986) (Powell,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (describing how gerrymandering was upheld even though
intended to benefit one political party over the other).
146 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 659 (White, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 665-66 (White, J., dissenting) (finding no evidence that the majority group
had been disadvantaged by the North Carolina redistricting plan).
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the fact that in North Carolina racial identification may be more pre-
dictive of voting behavior than political party affiliation. 148 Therefore,
barring consideration of race as a factor in redistricting appeared to
preclude legislative attempts to make decisions based upon traditional
predictions of reelection. Faced with this reality, Justice O'Connor
agreed with the four more liberal members of the Court that states do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause when they reapportion in a
manner that reinforces political party strength and incumbency pro-
tection, even when those factors may be consciously linked to the crea-
tion of racially stratified districts. 149
In 2004, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, concluded that polit-
ical gerrymandering claims pose nonjusticiable political questions. 150
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy argued in favor of leaving
the door open to future review of the issue on the grounds that "[a]
determination by the Court to deny all hopes of intervention could
erode confidence in the courts."151 The plurality's opinion highlights
the inequality lying beneath the surface of decisions governing legisla-
tive apportionment. Based upon the Court's current rulings, how-
ever, only racial gerrymandering remains subject to constitutional
challenge. 15 2 Under the guise of equality, the Court's approach con-
strains minority efforts to secure equal representation while virtually
eliminating constitutional constraints on a dominant majority. At the
same time that public education suffers from a process of resegrega-
tion,1 53 constitutional assessment of apportionment issues undercuts
efforts to equalize minority influence on legislative elections.
C. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges in the jury selection process may, on the
surface, appear unrelated to public education and apportionment is-
sues; nevertheless, they suffer from comparable underlying problems.
Historically, peremptory challenges reinforced invidious racial dis-
crimination.1 54 Prosecutors routinely used their peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude racial minorities from juries-especially when
dealing with minority defendants-so as to ensure the most advanta-
148 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 556 n.2 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring).
149 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (noting that courts will only inter-
vene when plaintiffs prove that racial considerations are "dominant and controlling" (quot-
ing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995))).
150 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1792 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(holding that no judicially discernible and manageable standards exist for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims).
151 Id. at 1794-95 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152 Id. at 1781 (applying a "predominant intent" test to racial gerrymandering claims
as an "easier and less disruptive" test).
153 See discussion supra Part I.
154 See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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geous jury for the state. 155 Conversely, even if defense counsel for a
minority defendant used all of his peremptory challenges in a race-
based manner, the result would still be a majority jury.
The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 156 holding that race could not be used as a factor for excluding
jurors. 157 When a pattern of racial challenges develops, the party who
uses those challenges must provide a race-neutral explanation for the
exclusion. 158 As with public education and apportionment, however,
the doctrine supporting this tool for eliminating race as a factor in
jury selection has a double edge, potentially of harming racial minori-
ties more than those in the majority. Batson's cruel twist in logic be-
came apparent after the Supreme Court later extended the reasoning
to prevent defense counsel as well as prosecutors from using race as a
factor in peremptory challenges. 159
Minority defendants and their lawyers do not face the same de-
gree of risks and rewards as prosecutors. According to Professor John
Francis, if both a prosecutor and defense counsel representing a mi-
nority defendant use peremptory challenges in a random fashion, it is
more likely that defense counsel will be seen as using strikes to elimi-
nate majority jurors than that the prosecutor will be viewed as using
strikes to eliminate minority jurors. 160
As a result of court-created rules, the use of peremptory chal-
lenges by a minority defendant for the purpose of securing a diverse
jury represents a racial motive even when the jury venire is overwhelm-
155 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(noting that "[m]isuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors has become
both common and flagrant").
156 Id. at 97-98.
157 Id. at 99 ("In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect
for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no
citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.").
158 Id. at 98.
159 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (barring white defendants from
excluding black jurors in a case involving allegations of hate crimes against African-Ameri-
can victims). Lower courts have applied the same reasoning to minority defendants who
have been barred from using their peremptory challenges to favorably shape the jury's
racial composition. See, e.g., State v. Carr, 427 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 1993); Griffin v. Mississippi,
610 So. 2d 354 (Miss. 1992).
160 See John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and Critical Mass: Means of Re-
claiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REv. __ (forthcoming January 2005). Statistically,
random challenges by both lawyers will target more majority jurors than minority jurors.
The greater the majority dominance of the jury, the greater the pattern of exclusion of
those jurors, and, therefore, the greater the likelihood of a challenge made on that basis.
With few minority jurors, a prosecutor may exclude most, or even all of them while also
excluding some majority jurors, thus, avoiding the appearance of a pattern of racial exclu-
sion. In contrast, defense counsel will essentially be required to eliminate at least some of
the lesser number of minority jurors in order to avoid patterns of apparent racial exclu-
sion. Id.
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ingly white. 16 1 In New Jersey, for example, an appellate court upheld
a trial judge's impaneling of an all-white jury after precluding the de-
fense attorney for a black defendant from retaining two black ju-
rors. 1 62 Indeed, the judges reached this result even though they
understood that the ruling contradicted underlying policies of inclu-
sion; they believed that such issues of peremptory challenge were fore-
closed by Batson.' 63 Although the original purpose of Batson was to
ensure minority participation on juries, "colorblind" application of its
rule has had the perverse result of prohibiting efforts to do so.
D. Assessing the Promise
Theories of equality may be used to rationalize each of the exam-
ples described. Definitions of equality, however, vary with the context
and ideology of the decisionmaker. For example, when the Supreme
Court bars lower court judges from addressing inequality driven by
private prejudice, it does so with Plessy-like reasoning that ends up de-
ferring to government decisions even when those decisions reflect and
reinforce social inequality built upon a history of racism. 164 As the
Plessy Court explained in 1896, "[i]f one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane."' 65 By refusing to question the majority's ostensibly
colorblind decisions, the Court allows the perpetuation of past
discrimination.
The current constitutional framework applied to public educa-
tion, apportionment, and peremptory challenges, however, cannot
fully be explained in terms of judicial restraint or majoritarian princi-
ples. The voting districts struck down in the North Carolina case had
been created by elected representatives.1 66 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court created the rules that regulate peremptory challenges,
while the lower courts created the perverse rulings that began with a
genuine aversion to racism, yet now impose heavy burdens on minori-
ties. In those instances, judicial reasoning parallels Dred Scott even
more than Plessy. In Plessy, the Court simply acquiesced to the major-
ity's racist scheme. In contrast, the Dred Scott Court not only struck
down majoritarian rule, but compounded the problem by insisting on
161 Id.
162 State v. Johnson, 737 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), vacated by
749 A.2d 367 (N. J. 2000), affd 766 A.2d 1126 (N.J. 2001), overruled by State v. Pagolin, 793
A.2d 638 (N.J. 2002).
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 & n.2 (1991) (concluding that
residential segregation in Oklahoma City could not even be considered a "vestige of for-
mer school segregation").
165 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
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constitutional principles based on racism.167 When the current Court
blocks the majority from addressing the racism that permeates our
society, it returns to the same path.
In 2003, the Supreme Court seemingly backed away from the Dred
Scott approach. By a one-vote margin, the Court permitted the Uni-
versity of Michigan to consciously address the reality of race discrimi-
nation when seeking diversity through its law school admissions
process. 168 Recognizing the compelling arguments for including a
"critical mass" of minority students in order to dispel racial stereo-
types, the Court's majority opinion written by Justice O'Conner, can
be read as a refusal to equate colorblindness with blindness.' 69 None-
theless, the opinion seems to have been more influenced by the views
of "major American businesses" and "high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military," whose amicus briefs
strongly supported the Michigan admissions policy, than with the
struggles of the minority applicants. 170
The Court's decision in the companion case, Gratz v. Botlinger,;
7
struck down the undergraduate admissions policies, limiting the Uni-
versity's options for achieving diversity.' 7 2 Justice Ginsburg's dissent,
however, remains faithful to the promises made in Brown to children
victimized by a racist history. Justice Ginsburg acknowledges "the ef-
fects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality"'173 and enduring dis-
parities reflecting "[i]rrational prejudice" and "[b]ias both conscious
and unconscious. '174 Because remnants of "a system of racial caste"
permeate broad aspects of society,175 constitutional doctrine must re-
main "both color blind and color conscious to prevent discrimination
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination."
'1 76
Justice Ginsburg accurately observed that race remains a salient,
often destructive force in contemporary American society. Beginning
in the 1990s, and in spite of declines in residential segregation,
schools have become increasingly resegregated-more now than at
any time since 1969. The trend has been directly linked to Supreme
167 See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
168 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
169 Id at 311-44.
170 Id. at 330-31.
171 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
172 J&
173 h[. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 300-01 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175 Id. at 299-300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing unemployment, poverty, access to
health care, neighborhood schools, job access, earning capacity, real estate markets, and
consumer transactions as evidence of continuing disparities).
176 Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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Court decisions made near the beginning of that decade. 1 7 7 Nearly
one-third more African American males sit in prisons or jails than at-
tend higher education. 178 When speaking about race, politicians have
learned to use code words like "quotas" and "states' rights" to success-
fully hide their invidious intentions, 179 and judicial sanctions fall heav-
ily on those who explicitly seek to redress racial inequality1R° Under
these circumstances, we should not be surprised if black children
choosing dolls fifty years later would still recognize the privilege of
being white.
CONCLUSION
Imagine two school board members. One believes in white
supremacy and assures that like-minded citizens will be able to send
their children to segregated schools by adopting a "colorblind" policy
of "neighborhood" schools. The other school board member recog-
nizes the educational advantages of diversity, understands the link be-
tween race and diversity, and defines attendance policies in a manner
promoting opportunities for racial integration. Yet, fifty years after
Brown, only the latter faces a serious risk of constitutional challenge.
We need to ask ourselves whether this interpretation of the Constitu-
tion remains faithful to the promise made to the school children who
won the battle of Brown v. Board of Education.
177 See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 132, at 18.
178 See JUSTICE POLICV INSTITUTE, CELLBLOCKS OR CLASSROOMS?: THE FUNDING OF
HIGHER EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN 9-10
(2002), at http://www.justicepolicy.org/downloads/cellblocksorclassrooms.pdf.
179 See Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-Coding" Colorblind Slurs During the Congres-
sional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 611, 622-35 (2000) (describing how politi-
cians have used seemingly innocuous words to mask racist agendas).
180 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995) (holding that
all government-created racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Richmond v.J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518-19 (1989) (establishing the test of "strict scrutiny" in cases
of affirmative action).
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